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This last decade has been a troubled period for the U.S. economy. We
have seen the value of the dollar tumble in foreign exchange markets so that
the expression “sound as a dollar” is no longer relevant. We have seen the
rate of growth in productivity decline so rapidly that it is difficult to
believe that not many years ago we were viewed as the technological giant of the
world. After a long secular decline in the price of ene~gy, we suddenly were
faced with quadrupled petroleum prices, an oil embargo, and a rather confused
body politic. And whereas we once were worried if the rate of inflation were as
high as 2 percent per year, we are now becoming accustomed to double digit inflation.
In my presentation today I would like to discuss these issues with you.
As my title suggests, I am neither a doomsayer nor an eternal optimist. What
distinguishes Americans from most other peoples of the world is the pragmatic,
problem solving approach we take to life’s problems. Problems represent
challenges, and as a nation we pride ourselves on turning stumbling blocks into
stepping stones.
The subjects I want to consider are not those usually on the agenda when
considering the agricultural economy. But they are subjects that are terribly
important to the health of the U.S. agricultural sector.
My comments are divided into five parts:
1. New Perspective on the U.S. Economy
2. The Multilateral Trade Negotiations
3. Exchange Rate Policy
4. Stagnation in Productivity Growth; and
5. Inflation.
At the end I will have some concluding comments.
$~Presented at the Midwest Banking Institute, University of Minnesota, Morris,
July 22, 1979.
**Professor and Head, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University
of i~~innesota.-2-
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE U.S. ECONOMY —.—
1 believe that we are now at a critical turning point in our history. As
a nation we are frustrated because we have come through almost 10 years of stagnant
economic growth and a corresponding decline in 01.IPrelative economic and political
power around the world. But by the same token, OUP economy has been exposed to
major shocks in the form of changed rules of the game and significant changes in
the economic conditions we face as a nation. We have hardly adjusted to these
changed conditions because the time has been too short, so we shouldn’t be too
hard on ourselves. And even as we make the adjustments, some of the changes
represent important opportunities for the future , rather than constraints to our
further development.
Our day and age is beset by many ironies. One of the more perplexing ironies
of recent years is the recurrent plea to “reindustrialized” the United States.
(BY reindustrializing, people who use this expression mean For us to go back TO th+
same industrial mix we had 20 years ago.) At its best, this notion is little morc~
than a romantic desire to return to the halcyon days of yore. The motivation for
this desire is a concern that the expansion of agriculture in response to growing
export markets is a return to peasantry and a concern that the growing imports of
manufactured goods is a threat to the level of employment here at home.
These concerns are at best misguided. If their implications were not so
pernicious, we would give them short shrift, A strong agriculture does not mean
that we are returning to a peasant society, even though it sometimes seems that
the pariahs of our day would have us go that route. In fact, our growing capacity
to export agricultural products is a reflection that in todayvs world agriculture
is a science-based rather than a resource-based industry. And an increase in the
imports of manufactured goods is not in itself a sign of economic stagnation on
our part. With low wages, other countries ought to have a comparative advantage
in the more labor-intensive industrial products , or even in labor-intensive-3-
agricultural products such as strawberries or tomatoes. Our comparative ——
advantage, on the other hand , appears to lie in high technology industries such
as agriculture, and in industries that supply the services of highly-skilled
craftsmen and professionals.
It is the nature of economic development that the combination of products
we produce changes as our per capita income rises. If were to impede the forces
giving rise to these changes, or to prevent them from working themselves out, we
would limit our own growth potential , while at the same time preventing the
diffusion of broad-based economic growth around the world. And impediments to
growth in other countries ultimately become impediments tc)growth here at home.
The danger in permitting these economic forces to wclrkthemselves out, of
course, is that we become more dependent on the rest of the world than we may feel
comfortable with. National security ultimately becomes an issue. For example, do
we want to depend for over half our supplies of petroleum on other countries?
Apparently, we are about to decide in the negative. Similarly, does Japan want to
depend on imports of agricultural products for over 50 percent of its caloric
intake? That is an issue they face. And could we successfully fight another war
if we let our industrial capability decline and depend on other countries for our
manufactured products?
If we could be assured of a world of peace over the next 50 years, we would
not be so concerned about the answers to these questions. Similarly, if we could
depend on international markets being competitive, without cartels, we would also
be less concerned. Clearly, we are talking about the rules of the game on the
international scene: about war and peace; about new rules for economic relations
among countries; and about new means of social, economic, and political intercourse
among nations.-4-
As a nation, we made a major contirbution to shaping the rules and
institutions that have governed international relations among countries since
World War II. Unfortunately, we appear to have lost our mettle in dealing with
the outside world at about the same time that many of the old rules and
institutions broke down. However, there are some encouraging developments, and
it is to these that I now want to turn.
THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGoTIATIONS (MTN)
We have just completed the seventh round of multilateral trade negotiations
since World War II. It is difficult to overestimate the significance of this
accomplishment. In mid-1977 when President Carter appointed Robert Strauss as
our chief trade negotiator, most observers felt the negotiations were not going
any place. Yet here we are two years later, with a package that passed the House
of Representatives almost two weeks ago by a margin of 396-7. And this in the
face of the strongest protectionist pressures we have seen since the 1930’s.
This round of trade negotiations was different from previous rounds in at
least three important respects, First, the United States insisted upon some
liberalization of trade in agricultural products, Agriculture had benefitted
little from previous rounds of trade negotiations, and if anything, barriers to
trade in agricultural products had become more restrictive over time rather than
less restrictive. This time the U.S. government repeatedly stated “No progress
in agricultural matters, no MTN”.
The second distinguishing characteristic of this round of trade negotiations
was the emphasis given to reducing non-tariff barriers to trade. These barriers
refer to policies such as quotas and embargoes, variable levies such as the
European Community uses to protect its agricultural sector, and the use of health
and sanitary regulations to keep out trade. These kinds of barriers have become
increasingly important impediments t-o trade, and had been neglected in previous
rounds of negotiations.-5-
The third distinguishing characteristic was the emphasis given to negotiating
improved rules of conduct for the use of trade policies and trade incentives.
The range of issues here was great. For example, until now there had heen ve~y
little discipline in the use of export subsidies to promote trade, yet almost every
country uses such subsidies at one time or another. Similarly, there were few
guidelines for how or when countervailing
duties are the logical response to export
by most countries. Without some rules of
duties could be used. Yet countervailing
subsidies, and have been used frequently
conduct, the use of expQrt subsidies
and countervailing duties can quickly escalate and lead to economic warfare.
Other rules of the game have to do with controlling the use of product
standards, product testing, and product certification systems as barriers to
trade; the use of government procurement codes to discriminate against foreign
suppliers; the harmonization of procedures used to furnish import licenses; and
a uniform international system of customs valuation.
It is difficult to assess the benefits from trade concessions, especially
when so much emphasis was placed on improved rules of the game. But estimates
by the Department of Agriculture suggest that we received specific trade concessions
covering approximately $4.o billion in agricultural exports, and that these
concessions will cause our exports to increase eventually by about a half billion
dollars.
Trade is a two-way street, of course, and we also granted concessions tQ
other countries. These concessions will lead to lower prices and greater access
to foreign products for our consumers here at home. Improved trade also represents
one of the few disciplines we have over monopoly pricing in our concentrated
industries.-6-
EXCHANGE RATE POLICY
The rules which govern the rate at which the currency of one count~y
exchanges for another were changed rather dramatically a few years ago. The
world had operated with a system of fixed exchange rates for roughly 25 years
after World War II. That policy was established at the Bretton-Woods Conference
in 1944, and was based on a belief that competitive devaluations had played a
major role in spreading the Great Depression of the United States to the rest of
the world. Signatories to the Bretton-Woods convention agreed to fix the value of
their currencies in terms of the U.S. dollar, and to change them only after
consulting with othe~ counties.
This system served the advanced countries of the wo~ld quite well. Trade
expanded at a faster rate than world GNP throughout the post-World War II period.
And the system imposed some much needed discipline on monetary and fiscal policy
in the advanced countries. In so doing, it enabled them to keep inflation reasonably
well under control.
Despite these positive benefits from the fixed exchange rate system, it
became increasingly clear through the years that the system did not have the
flexibility to accommodate changing economic conditions. The dollar in particular





exhortations by political leaders had little effect in restoring
the balance of payments. Consequently, President Nixon undertook
devaluation of the dollar in mid-1971. After that did not prove
effective, in early 1973 he devalued once again, closed the gold window, and for
all intents and purposes forced the advanced countries to shift -toa system of
flexible exchange rates.-7-
Two important consequences for agriculture followed ftiomthese developments.
First, an overvalued currency has the same effect as imposing an export tax on the
economy. The only difference is that it is implicit, rather than explicit. The
effect of the devaluation and the shift to floating exchange rates was to remove
this tax from agriculture. With this change in policy, our agricultural exports
became much more competitive, and of course this is one of the reasons our exports
have grown so rapidly in recent years. Moreover, our agricultural resources are
now reflecting their true value to society, with the re~ult that farm incomes are
substantially higher than they were prior to the devaluation and the value of
land has increased dramatically.
The second consequence of this shift to flexible exchange rates is not
entirely an unmixed blessing. For example, conventional wisdom had it that when
we shifted to a system of flexible exchange rates we would have more independence
in economic policy. The belief was that we would experience fewer shocks from
abroad, and at the same time be able to manage our domestic economy without
considerations for its consequences to other economies.
Paradoxically, of course, we have had more economic summits to coordinate
economic policy since we shifted to flexible exchange rates than we ever had with
fixed exchange rates. The reason for this is that our economies have become
increasingly linked together by a very efficient and large international
capital market. Whereas in the past, most of the international adjustment came
about through changes in trade flows, now it comes about through shifts in capital.
This also has important ramifications for agriculture. In fact, agriculture
has become much more unstable than it was in the past, and largely because of the
flexible exchange rate system. Let’s see how this works.
Consider, for example, the events of last October when the U.S. government
finally decided to defend the dollar. It did so by rai$ing interest rates, i.e.,
by pursuing a tighter monetary policy. The increase in interest rates associatedwith these policies caused the value of the dollar to rise in international
markets since it attracted funds that were invested in other currencies. This
increase in the value of the dollar , other things being equal, acts to choke off
the demand fop our exports, including agricultural exports. Clearly, agriculture
as an export sector has to bear a large
defend the value of the dollar.
Now consider more recent events.
been pursuing more restrictive monetary
share of the burden of any effort to
Countries such as Germany and Japan have
policies than those pursued by the United
States. Consequently, the rate of interest for funds invested in those currencies
is higher, with the result that funds have shifted out 0$ the dollar to the yen and
D-mark. The value of the dollar, in
This fall in the value of the dollar
to make agriculture more prosperous.
To summarize, with flexible or
turn, has fallen in international markets.
acts as a stimulant to our exports, and acts
floating exchange rates, agriculture as an
export sector is much more subject to external events, such as shifts in monetary
policy, than it was with a system of fixed exchange rates. It is for this reason
that I noted earlier that we can expect agriculture to be much more unstable with
floating exchange rates than it was with fixed rates.
STAGNATION IN PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
The rate of growth in productivity has declined markedly in the U.S.
economy. The Presidentts Council of Economic Advisors noted in its 1979 report
that “Between 1948 and 1965 (labor) productivity growth in the private non-farm
sector averaged 2.6 percent per year. In 1965-73 this rate declined to 2.0 percent.
Since 1973, private non-farm productivity growth has averaged less than 1.0 percent
per year” (p. 67). A similar but less dramatic decline, of course, has taken
place with agriculture, independently of whether the trend is measured in terms
of labor productivity, land productivity, or some measure of total factor
productivity (Schuh).This decline in the rate of productivity growth has far reaching
implications for the United States. In the first place, without g~owth in
productivity, it is difficult to obtain an increase in per capita incomes.
Second, stagnation in productivity growth is one reason for the increase in the
rate of inflation. In fact, the increase in the rate of inflation almost parallels
the decline in the rate of productivity growth.
Third, stagnating productivity makes it difficult for the U.S. to compete
in international markets, independently of whether the decline is in the farm
or non-farm sector. In the case of agriculture, it is important to note that our
domestic agricultural programs are predicated on a strong export performance.
Without strong exports we would have to engage in costly set-aside programs and
probably accumulate large stocks in government hands.
More generally, to the extent we become less competitive in international
markets, the real exchange rate between the dollar and other currencies will
decline. That in itself implies a decline in real income, for it means that we
have to pay more in terms of products we export to pay for those we import.
The reasons for the decline in productivity growth are not fully understood,
although they are attracting increased attention on the part of both researchers
and policy-makers. One problem, of course, is that our private savings rate is
now one of the lowest among the industrialized countries of the world. Low
savings rates translate directly into low investment rates. And our rate of capital
formation has indeed been low in recent years.
Secondly, our commitment to research and development has tapered off, both
at the national level and in the case of agriculture. In constant value terms,
and as a share of our total GNP, we simply are investing a great deal less in
R and D than we did in the past.10
We also have made important shifts in our research mix. First, an excessive
emphasis on accountability has caused us to de-emphasize basic research and over-
emphasize applied research. Basic research is needed if we are to identify and
create the production potential of the future. Without basic research this
productivity of applied research will decline rather quickly. Second, we have
shifted research resources away from a production orientation and channeled it
toward ecological and environmental problems. A greater concern with ecological
and environmental problems was probably needed. But when this concern was
satisfied at the expense of production research, we shouldn’t be surprised to
see the rate of productivity growth decline.
Another explanation for the decline in productivity growth is the increase
in regulations designed to clean up the environment, and the costs these regulations
impose on the private sector. It is entirely appropriate that society should ask
for clean air and clean water. But by the same token, we need to understand that
such important outputs do not come as a free lunch. They involve resources,
and these resources could have produced something else, or had an alternative use.
One final comment on productivity growth. Society can deal with emerging
problems much more easily if productivity is growing. In effect, an increase
in productivity amounts to an increase in resources, which in turn provides
increased resources for dealing with the problem, whatever it might be.
The bottom line, of course, is that low productivity growth means low
growth in per capita income. With low growth in per capita incomes, a struggle
almost inevitably develops over the division of the pie. Hence, if this recently
observed stagnation in productivity continues, we can expect to see in the
future a great deal more political concern over the distribution of income and
the distribution of assets.11
INFLATION
There is much that I could say about inflation. It has moved center
stage in current policy discussions, and appears to be one of the more perplexing
policy problems we face.
I would like to focus on three rather serious consequences of inflation -
consequences that are subtle and therefore difficult to observe, but which have
a rather substantial impact on the economy. First, inflation has an impact on
the form in which members of the society hold assets as a store of wealfh. With
unstable rates of inflation, individuals tend to be more concerned with the extent
to which the value of their savings are preserved , and less about the productive
rate of return on their investments. This means that individuals buy up iand and
other physical assets, and reduce their assets in savings accounts, in bonds, and
so forth. This shift in portfolio is one reason why agricultural land values are
rising so rapidly. It also helps explain why our measured savings rate is so low -
a phenomenon that many people believe is behind the stagnation in our productivity
growth.
Inflation is also destructive of capital markets - especially when governments
intervene to fix interest rates. Without changes in the rules, certain credit
and savings instruments will simply disappear. And without them, savings rates
will decline and investments of certain kinds
effect of Regulation Q on the availability of
example.
will decline or disappear. The
mortgage money is an important
More generally, we tend to forget that with recent rates of inflation, the
nominal rate of interest has to be relatively high to provide any real return.
For example, with inflation now running at almost an 11 percent rate, an eleven
percent interest rate is effectively a zero real rate of interest. If one takes
account of the taxes to be paid on interest earnings, it is in effect a negative
real rate of interest . With interest rates on savings accounts of about 5 percent12
the negative real rate of interest becomes relatively large. In effect, savers
are asked to pay someone to take their money and use it. Under these circumstances,
we should not be surprised that savings rates are so low.
Finally, I would like to emphasize the connection between a devaluing
exchange rate and inflation. We tend to forget that when the value of the dollar
falls in international markets, both the prices of imports and the prices of
exports increase. As trade becomes more important to the health of our economy,
these effects become more and more important.
It is true that the value of a nation~s cuprency declines because of an
increase in inflation. But by the same token, the value of the currency affects
the rate of inflation. As long as exchange rates are free to float we will be
troubled by this linkage.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In concluding, I want to make three points. First, the agenda I have
reviewed with you is not the conventional agenda one has in mind when thinking
about agriculture. Yet T hope I have persuaded you of the importance of these
issues to U.S. farm problems, and of the various linkages among them.
Second, we really have no reason to despair about the problems we face.
The world
adjust to
has become much more complex than it once was. And we have had to
some rather sizeable shocks, such as the quadrupling of energy prices,
the devaluation of the dollar, and the shift to floating exchange rates. The
important thing is that the remedies or medicines that some of these shocks
represented were much needed.
to these shocks are now behind
Moreover,
us . With
an important part of the adjustments
sound economic policy, and stability in
policy, we can regain a great deal of our competitive potential in a fairly
short period of time.13
Finally, we do need to
de want for the future. The
rules and institutions which
persevere in helping to construct the kind of world
United States played a major role in designing the
governed political and economic relations among
countries throughout the post-war period. That set of rules and institutions
has essentially collapsed, with little to put in its place. Consequently, we
ape now resorting to a great deal of ad hoccery in dealing with individual
problems as they arise. One of the great challenges now before us is to muster
the creativity to help design a new world order that will enable the peoples of
the world to relate to each other in peaceful economic intercourse, and that will
enable us to deal systematically with new problems as they arise. We then need
to muster the political will to help implement that new order - an order that
will make a better future for us as well as for other peoples of the world.